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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JAMES EDWARD BOYKIN, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-25397 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, 
LOCAL 100, AFL-CIO, 
Respondents. 
JAMES EDWARD BOYKIN, pro se 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (DANIEL TOPPER of 
Counsel), for New York City Transit Authority 
KENNEDY, SCHWARTZ & CURE, P.C. (STUART LICHTEN of counsel), 
for Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100, AFL-CIO 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by James Edward Boykin to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that dismissed Boykin's improper practice charge 
against the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and the Transport Workers Union 
of America, Local 100, AFL-CIO (TWU) alleging, as amended, that NYCTA violated 
§§209-a.1(a) and (b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
discriminating against him in his employment and that TWU violated §209-a.2(a) of the 
Act by denying him his right to participate in his employee organization. 
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NYCTA and TWU filed answers denying the allegations and, thereafter, moved to 
dismiss Boykin's improper practice charge prior to hearing on the grounds that Boykin's 
charge failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The ALJ granted the 
motion to dismiss and Boykin filed exceptions to the ALJ decision. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Boykin excepts to the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the decision of the ALJ to dismiss the charge. 
FACTS 
While Boykin disputes the ALJ's findings of fact, the record supports the ALJ's 
findings1 and we here adopt them. 
Boykin alleges in his improper practice charge that, on June 1, 2004, he was 
appointed to the position of bus driver for the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit 
Operating Authority (MABSTOA). Thereafter, he underwent training from June 17, 2004 
to July 8, 2004. 
On June 22, 2004, while driving a MABSTOA bus, he collided with a cement 
barrier. On an unspecified date, between June 24, 2004 and June 28, 2004, Boykin 
was cited by one of the instructors for failing to yield to pedestrians. Although Boykin 
passed the road test given to him on June 29, 2004, he was sent back to the training 
facility. 
On July 8, 2004, Boykin was assigned to drive a bus with a training instructor, 
Randy Spolton, accompanying him. Boykin alleges that Spolton's remarks about his 
1
 38 PERB H4524 (2005). 
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driving were pompous and arrogant. Spolton told Boykin that he had problems with his 
driving. Boykin was assigned a different instructor to complete the assigned route. 
Upon Boykin's return to the bus facility, he met with a Mr. Clark, the General 
Superintendent for NYCTA and a TWU representative to discuss the problem with 
Spolton. Clark directed Boykin to appear at the training facility on July 9, 2004 to meet 
with a Mr. Mulano. On July 9, 2004, Boykin alleges that his employment was 
terminated without a TWU representative present. 
Boykin alleges that MABSTOA put Spolton on the training route with him in order 
"to provoke him in some form or fashion." He then alleges that MABSTOA terminated 
his employment as an effort to stifle his "freedom of expression and self person or to 
have me terminated from the job." In his letter of January 20, 2005, following a 
conference on the instant improper practice charge, Boykin states that his "charge 
against the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) is racism and discrimination." 
Boykin further alleges in this letter that the: 
charge against the Transport Workers Union Local 100 (TWU) is 
that TWU did not protect my rights as guaranteed in section two 
hundred two, §209-a.2(a); in that TWU did not protect my right to 
keep my jobs; and TWU and NYCTA are cohort in my termination 
from work and TWU did not protect my civil freedom of expression 
and speech. 
DISCUSSION 
Boykin's assertions in the record before the ALJ and in his exceptions focus on 
his theory that the NYCTA and TWU discriminated against him on the basis of race and 
not because of any protected activity under the Act. Boykin's recitation of the facts fails 
to supply any basis upon which we could exercise jurisdiction over what is essentially a 
claim alleging racial discrimination in employment rather than interference with 
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protected rights under §202 of the Act. We do not have jurisdiction over allegations 
that an employee has been discriminated against because of race.2 
Based upon the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 8, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
tu^M^c^^^^-^L^^ 
2
 See State of New York (Rockland Psychiatric Center) and Civil Service Employees 
Ass'n, 25 PERB 1J3012 (1992). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, SUNY PURCHASE 
LOCAL 637, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-24432 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW YORK), 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (TIMOTHY CONNICK 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (JAMES WALSH 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (State 
University of New York) (State) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that 
found a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) on an improper practice charge filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, SUNY Purchase Local 637 (CSEA), alleging that 
the State conducted a motor vehicle license search on CSEA's local president, Frank 
Williams in retaliation for his union activities. The State raised in its answer, inter alia, 
the affirmative defense of timeliness and that CSEA had failed to set forth facts upon 
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which a violation may be found. The State excepts to the ALJ's determination that the 
State's search of Williams' driver's license was improperly motivated. 
CSEA filed cross-exceptions to that part of the ALJ's decision that dismissed the 
charge's allegations that, effective July 3, 2003, the State reassigned Williams, a 
cleaner, from the night shift to the day shift for improper reasons, finding that the record 
did not establish improper motivation for William's reassignment. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm in part, and reverse in part, the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts as set forth in the ALJ's decision1 are disputed by the parties. The 
facts, as we find them to be established in the record, are set forth below. 
Williams has been employed by the State since December 1998 at the State 
University of New York at Purchase (SUNY) as a Grade 5 cleaner. At the time of the 
hearing on the improper practice charge, Williams held the elected position of CSEA 
Local 637 president. During his five years as president, Williams has filed numerous 
grievances, the most recent of which dealt with allegations that Grade 11 supervisors 
were working overtime as cleaners. In August 2002, John Byrnes, Head Cleaner, filed a 
criminal harassment complaint against Williams with the campus police based in part on 
Williams' behavior towards Byrnes when Williams was told that he would not receive a 
promotion. Williams was also charged with improper behavior towards another 
supervisor on December 12, 2002 and the two charges were the subject of an improper 
practice charge brought by CSEA alleging that the charges were issued in retaliation for 
1
 38 PERB H4508 (2005). 
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Williams' complaints about the overtime system. By a stipulation of settlement, executed 
June 17, 2003, the improper practice charge was withdrawn, the Notices of Discipline 
against Williams were rescinded and Williams was issued a counseling memorandum 
regarding his behavior. 
For the past fifteen years, at the end of each school year, cleaners' shifts are 
changed to provide the largest number of staff working days to prepare the College for 
the fall semester. SUNY changed Williams' shift in the Summer of 2002 but, based 
upon the intercession of Dan Sedgwick, Manager of the Performing Arts Center, 
Williams was allowed to continue with his regular night shift assignment in 2002. In April 
2003, Williams received notice of a shift change for the summer from his immediate 
supervisor, Anna May Harting, Supervising Janitor. Williams complained to the Joseph 
Olenik ,Chief of Campus Police and Chief Operating Officer of SUNY Purchase and 
Maritime College, , about the shift change, noting that he operated a painting business 
in addition to his State employment and that it would be a hardship for him to work the 
day shift during the summer months. Williams opined that, in light of his situation, any 
shift change must be viewed as a retaliatory action because of his activities as CSEA 
Local 637 President. Olenik wrote to Williams and assured him that his shift change had 
nothing to do with either his union activities or his private business. Olenik, as a past 
PBA president, applauded Williams for his efforts on behalf of CSEA unit members. 
During the summer of 2003, Williams worked the day shift. 
On April 22, 2003, Williams, as CSEA local president, wrote to Thomas 
Schwartz, President of SUNY Purchase. In that letter, Williams complained that a 
Grade 5 cleaner had been passed over for promotion. The letter was copied to Olenik; 
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John Byrnes, Head Janitor; Barbara Gianoplus, Personnel Director; and Carl 
Rasmussen, CSEA Labor Relations Specialist. 
Williams testified that in April or May 2003, he learned that a search had been 
conducted into whether he had a valid New York State driver's license through the 
NYSPIN (New York Statewide Police Information Network) system. An article later 
appeared in the student newspaper in which Olenik identified an anonymous telephone 
call as the basis for the inquiry into the status of Williams' license and that the phone 
number was identified as one in the office assigned to Byrnes. 
When asked whether he had a New York State driver's license in April or May 
2003, Williams testified that he did not, but that he possessed a Rhode Island driver's 
license. He explained that as a cleaner he does not have access to a State vehicle nor 
is it a condition of his employment to be able to drive one, that he owns a motor vehicle 
that he drives to work on the SUNY campus and that he did not suffer any adverse 
consequences as the result of the NYSPIN search of his driver's license. 
Byrnes testified on behalf of the State that Olenik was not involved in changing 
Williams' shift in 2003 because all of Byrnes' discussions regarding Williams' shift 
change were with Byrnes' supervisor, Vito Liberatore. Olenik became involved later only 
because Williams complained to him. Byrnes also denied that he called the campus 
police to complain that Williams did not have a New York State driver's license. All the 
supervising janitors, the recycling manager, and some of the janitors had access to the 
telephone in Byrnes' office. 
Olenik has been Chief of Campus Police and Chief Operating Officer since June 
2003 and reports directly to Schwartz, SUNY Purchase's president. Olenik testified that 
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he received an anonymous complaint that Williams did not have a driver's license and 
that he was driving on State roads. Thereafter, Olenik ordered the NYSPIN search on 
the basis of that call. NYSPIN searches have been frequently conducted by the Campus 
Police and, at least once previously, have been initiated by an anonymous call. 
During cross-examination, Olenik acknowledged that he was aware of Williams' 
position as local CSEA president and of the fact that Williams had filed grievances and 
an improper practice charge. Olenik took no part in the decision to change Williams' 
shift in the summer of 2003. When questioned about the NYSPIN search, Olenik 
explained that he wrote a memorandum about the anonymous call and gave it to 
Assistant Chief Pete Macaluso, who conducted the investigation into Williams' driver's 
license.2 Olenik assigned the investigation to Macaluso to avoid any conflicts between 
himself and CSEA because of his supervisory position.3 
In the memorandum to Macaluso, Olenik referenced the fact that Williams drives 
a vehicle to and from work and that, although Olenik had no knowledge of Williams 
driving a State vehicle, Williams does have access to them. Olenik also stated that he 
had another occasion where an anonymous call prompted him to order a NYSPIN 
search. While the anonymous call came from a phone assigned to an office used by 
Byrnes, Olenik testified that he had not recognized the caller's voice as Byrnes. Olenik 
acknowledged that he spoke with Schwartz about the NYSPIN search prior to the 
president sending a memorandum dated February 27, 2004 to faculty and staff.4 
2
 Charging Party's Exhibit 11. 
3
 Transcript, p. 299. 
4
 Charging Party's Exhibit 9. 
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Schwartz had wanted clarification from Olenik about the NYSPIN search because 
Williams had led him to believe that a criminal record search had been conducted. 
DISCUSSION 
The State argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that the record supports a 
finding of improper motivation in conducting the NYSPIN search of Williams. We agree. 
To establish discrimination or retaliation under §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act, a 
charging party must prove that (a) he/she had engaged in protected activities, (b) the 
respondent had knowledge of those activities, and (c) the respondent acted because of 
those activities.5 If the charging party proves a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
burden of going forward shifts to the respondent to establish that its actions were 
motivated by legitimate business reasons.6 A charging party can establish the 
existence of anti-union animus by statements or by circumstantial evidence, which may 
be rebutted by evidence of legitimate business reasons for the actions taken, unless 
those reasons are found to be pretextual.7 
CSEA alleged that the State, through Olenik, directed that a NYSPIN search be 
made as to Williams' driver's license in retaliation for Williams' exercise of protected 
activity. The charge must be dismissed because there is no evidence of improper 
motivation on the part of Olenik, who initiated the NYSPIN search. While Williams was 
involved in protected activities in his role as CSEA President and Olenik was aware of 
5
 City of Salamanca, 18 PERB 1J3012 (1985); Town of North Hempstead, 32 PERB 
113006(1999). 
6
 State of New York (SUNY Oswego), 34 PERB 1J3017 (2001); State of New York (State 
University of New York at Buffalo), 33 PERB 1J3020 (2000). 
7
 Town of Independence, 23 PERB 1J3020 (1993). 
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some of Williams' actions, there is no independent evidence that Olenik harbored any 
anti-union animus toward Williams. Indeed, Olenik complimented Williams on his 
advocacy on behalf the CSEA bargaining unit members. CSEA cannot rely on the 
presumed animosity between Byrnes and Williams from their past dealings as evidence 
of improper motivation on the part of Olenik. The record does not establish that Byrnes 
made the anonymous telephone call, or, if he did, that Olenik was aware that the call 
came from Byrnes. Olenik's initiation of the NYSPIN search cannot, therefore, be found 
to be improper as tainted by Byrnes' animus towards Williams.8 To the extent that the 
ALJ's finding that Olenik was improperly motivated is based upon circumstantial 
evidence, what the ALJ describes as incredulous testimony or the inferences he drew 
from the testimony, we decline to adopt his findings.9 The ALJ concluded that "Williams 
was targeted in an unfounded and unsuccessful effort to get him into trouble and to 
prevent him from driving to and from work" and that he could "...not accept Olenik's 
representation that the threshold warranting such an invasion of privacy is so low as to 
justify the search of Williams' records solely on the idle speculation of an unidentified 
caller." The ALJ's conclusions are unsupported by any record evidence and appear to 
be his personal opinions, unsupported by fact or law. While the ALJ might conclude that 
Williams was targeted, the allegation that he did not have a New York State driver's 
license was not "unfounded"; it proved to be true. There is no record evidence that 
anyone was trying to get Williams "into trouble" and certainly, no evidence that anyone 
B
 Croton-Harmon Union Free Sch. Dist, 31 PERB 1J3086 (1998). 
9
 Benson v. Cuevas, 293 AD2d 927, 35 PERB 1J7008 (3d Dep't), motion for leave to 
appeal denied, 98 NY2d 611, 35 PERB 1J7017 (2002). 
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sought "to prevent him from driving to and from work". That Olenik, as the Chief of the 
Campus Police and a former police officer would investigate a tip that someone was 
driving without a license on his campus is not surprising or suspicious. The fact that this 
incident was only the second in which the tip came from an anonymous telephone call is 
not relevant given the myriad of reasons that could trigger a NYSPIN search. There are 
any number of non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory reasons why Olenik might have acted 
on the tip, but neither party chose to explore them on the record. Timing alone is 
insufficient to establish improper motivation10 and that the timing of the NYSPIN search 
is suspect is all that can be reasonably inferred from this record. 
The record is clear that Williams, as local CSEA President, had filed grievances 
on behalf of unit members and was, therefore, engaged in protected activity and that 
Olenik, Chief of Campus Police and Chief Operating Officer, was aware of Williams' 
protected activities. However, the record lacks evidence that the State, through Olenik, 
would not have acted but for Williams' protected activity. An employer's conduct must 
be deliberate in order for us to find a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act.11 
CSEA, in its cross-exceptions, contends that the ALJ erred in dismissing so 
much of the charge that alleged that Williams' shift was changed in retaliation for 
Williams' protected activity. We disagree. 
It is undisputed that, in prior years, SUNY has changed work schedules in the 
summer months to prepare the campus for the students' return in the fall. As the ALJ 
10
 Roswell Park Cancer Institute, 34 PERB 1J3040 (2001); see also, County of Monroe 
and Monroe County Sheriff, 33 PERB 1J3044 (2000); Town of North Hempstead, 32 
PERB H3006 (1999); Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist of the City of New York, 14 
PERB H3005(1981). 
11
 See Greenburgh #11 Union Free Sch. Dist, 33 PERB 1J3018 (2000). 
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noted, the evidence shows that, but for Sedgwick's intervention, Williams' work shift 
would have changed in 2002, notwithstanding his private painting business. SUNY was 
continuing that practice when it changed Williams' schedule for the Summer of 2003. It 
was because Sedgwick did not press the college to excuse Williams from the shift 
change that he was required to comply with the shift changes, not his exercise of 
protected rights. CSEA's cross-exceptions are, therefore, denied. 
Based upon our review of the record, we grant the State's exceptions and 
reverse the ALJ's finding that the State violated the Act when a NYSPIN search was 
conducted on Williams' driver's license. We deny CSEA's cross-exceptions and affirm 
the decision of the ALJ, dismissing the charge as to Williams' Summer 2003 shift 
reassignment. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety, 
DATED: August 8, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
tu^M^c^u^^-^L^^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5412 
POUGHKEEPSIES' JOINT WATER PROJECT BOARD, 
Employer, 
- and -
CITY OF POUGHKEEPSIE, 
Employer, 
- and -
TOWN OF POUGHKEEPSIE, 
- and -
Employer, 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Incumbent/lntervenor. 
THOMAS HALLEY, ESQ., for Petitioner 
GELLERT & KLEIN, P.C. (DAVID R. WISE of counsel), for Poughkeepsies' 
Joint Water Supply Project 
STEPHEN J. WING, CORPORATION COUNSEL, for City of Poughkeepsie 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (DAREN J. RYLEWICZ of 
counsel), for Incumbent/lntervenor 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of Poughkeepsie (City), the 
Poughkeepsies' Joint Water Project Board (Project Board) and the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the City and the Project Board, as well 
as the Town of Poughkeepsie (Town), are joint employers of the employees who work 
at the Poughkeepsies' Joint Water Project (Joint Project). The United Federation of 
Police Officers, Inc. (Federation) had filed the instant petition seeking to fragment those 
employees from a City-wide unit of employees represented by CSEA and represent 
them in a separate bargaining unit.1 
After a hearing at which the City, CSEA and the Federation were present, the 
ALJ issued a decision finding that the Project Board, the City and the Town constituted 
a joint employer and that the employees of the Joint Employer were no longer 
appropriately included in the City-wide unit represented by CSEA.2 
EXCEPTIONS 
The City excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that it is the sole employer of the 
employees who work at the Joint Project. The Project Board joins in the City's 
exceptions. CSEA also excepts to the finding that the City is not the sole employer. The 
Federation concurs with the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
1
 The ALJ made no other determinations as to unit appropriateness. 
2
 The Project Board did not appear but, in its letter brief, concurred with the City's 
position. Although put on notice by the ALJ, the Town has not appeared in this matter. 
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FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision and are repeated here only as 
necessary to address the exceptions.3 
The City, until 1995, operated a water treatment plant, staffed by City employees 
who were included in the City-wide unit represented by CSEA. In 1995, the City and the 
Town entered into an inter-municipal agreement whereby the Town became a co-owner 
of the water treatment facility. The agreement created the Joint Project. The Joint 
Project is funded by fees collected from water users in the City and the Town under a 
metering formula. 
The Joint Project is administered by the six-member Project Board, with the City 
and the Town each appointing three members. The Project Board establishes and 
maintains the capital fund and the operating fund. The revenue to fund the operating 
budget is derived from meter fees and the budget is administered by the City, for a fee. 
The Joint Project fund is maintained as a discrete account, separate from any City 
funds, and is utilized only to fund the budget of the Joint Project. 
The Project Board hires the Water Plant Administrator, subject to the approval of 
the City and the Town. The Administrator is charged with preparing an annual budget 
for approval by the Project Board, before its submission to the City and the Town for 
consideration and adoption. The Administrator is also responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of the Joint Project, including the supervision of all employees working for 
the Joint Project. 
3
 38 PERB H4008 (2005). 
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After the pre-hearing conference in this matter, the Town and the City deleted the 
language from their inter-municipal agreement that had made the Administrator 
responsible for the hiring, firing, transfer and discipline of Joint Project employees. The 
City is now designated in the inter-municipal agreement as the appointing authority and 
employer of those employees. The employees are paid through the City payroll account 
and receive the same benefits as City employees, as governed by City personnel 
practices and the City-CSEA collective bargaining agreement. 
DISCUSSION 
A joint employer relationship rests on a finding of shared or divided control over 
the employees' terms and conditions of employment.4 We have analyzed this 
relationship between governmental entities sharing control in cases involving public 
libraries5, community colleges6, highway departments7, and county sheriffs8. But it is our 
decision in Town of North Castle9 which is the most instructive in reaching a decision as 
to the relationship between the Project Board, the City and the Town. North Castle 
involved a town and its various sewer and water districts. The Board, in weighing the 
uniting criteria set forth in §207 of the Act, determined that the various water and sewer 
4
 See County of Orange and Sheriff of County of Orange, 14 PERB 1J3012 (1981). 
5
 See New York Public Library v PERB, 45 AD2d 271, 7 PERB 7013 (1st Dep't 1974), 
aff'd, 37 NY2d 752, 8 PERB 1J7013 (1975). 
6
 See County of Jefferson and Jefferson County Community College, 26 PERB 1J3010 
(1993), confirmed sub nom. Jefferson County v PERB, 204 AD2d 1001, 27 PERB 
1J7010 (4th Dep't 1994), leave to appeal denied, 84 NY2d 804, 27 PERB 1J7014 (1994). 
7
 See Town of Ramapo, 8 PERB 1J3057 (1975). 
8
 See County of Putnam, 33 PERB 1J3001 (2000). 
919 PERB H3025(1986). 
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districts, created by the Town for the provision of specific services, were little more than 
departments of the Town and could not be considered to be public employers, either in 
their own right or as joint employers with the Town. Those districts were not the 
appointing authorities of their employees, the Town was. Those districts likewise had no 
control over terms and conditions of employment and did not control their budgets. 
Here, the Town and the City control the budget of the Joint Project by each 
retaining the power to review and approve or disapprove the budget submitted to them 
by the Project Board. Given this financial control, the City and the Town are joint 
employers of the employees of the Joint Project.10 A joint employer relationship exists 
when the control over the employment relationship is divided between two public 
employers to the point where there cannot be meaningful negotiations without a joint 
employer designation.11 As the Project Board has budget preparation authority and the 
authority to establish and maintain the capital fund and the operating fund of the Joint 
Project, it, too, holds one of the purse strings to the money to be utilized to fund any 
contractual wages and benefits negotiated for the employees of the Joint Project.12 
While the City is the appointing authority, the Joint Board appoints the Plant 
Administrator who is charged with overseeing the day-to-day operation of the Joint 
Project and formulating the Joint Project's annual budget. 
10
 See Jefferson County Community Coll., supra, note 5, and cases cited therein. 
"County of Nassau and Nassau County Sheriff, 25 PERB 1J3026 (1997). 
12
 See Genesee Community College, 24 PERB 1J3017 (1991), aff'g 23 PERB 1J4068 
(1993), where College employees were paid by the County from County and College 
funds, but the President of the college was the appointing authority and exercised day-
to-day control over the employees; the County and the College were found to be joint 
employers. 
Board - C-5412 -6 
Irrespective of the fact that the City and Town have identified the City as the 
employer of the employees of the Joint Project, as it is PERB's statutory duty to define 
who is a joint public employer, we are not bound by their agreement.13 
Based on the foregoing, we find that the City, the Town and the Project Board 
constitute a joint public employer within the meaning of §201.6(b) of the Act. 
The exceptions of the City, CSEA and the Joint Board are, therefore, denied, and 
the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
The matter is hereby remanded to the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation for further processing consistent with this decision. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 8, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
13
 Act, §201.6(b). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 
AND POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-24120 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
HINMAN STRAUB P.C. (NANCY L. BURRITT of counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York State Correctional 
Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge alleging that 
the State of New York (Department of Correctional Services) (DOCS) violated §209-
a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
terminated a practice of granting employees' requests for pre-approved sick leave of 
four hours or less to attend scheduled medical appointments. 
EXCEPTIONS 
NYSCOPBA, in its exceptions, contends that the ALJ erred on the law and the 
facts. Specifically, NYSCOPBA argues that the ALJ erred by failing to recognize a 
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change in facility procedures with respect to obtaining work coverage for four or fewer 
hours of pre-approved sick leave; equating pre-approved sick leave with vacation leave 
and, therefore, determining the subject to be a non-mandatory subject for negotiations; 
finding that NYSCOPBA was attempting to change the charge into one involving a 
unilateral denial of overtime for those who formerly worked full shifts of overtime to 
cover for pre-approved sick leave of four and fewer hours; finding that the direct 
participation of the Governor or the Governor's Office of Employee Relations (GOER) 
was required to establish a past practice, or a change thereof; and failing to find that 
DOCS' directives demonstrated a delegation of authority to the facility to establish or 
change practices in these regards. 
DOCS filed cross-exceptions to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred by 
failing to find the issue to be one of agency-wide concern and by considering the 
practice on the facility level. DOCS further alleges that the ALJ erred on the law by 
failing to decide DOCS' motion to amend its answer to include a timeliness defense. 
Based upon the record and our consideration of the parties' arguments, we affirm 
the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The facts, as relied upon by the ALJ,1 are disputed by the parties in their 
exceptions. The facts as we find them to be established in the record, are set forth 
below. 
On March 14, 2003, NYSCOPBA filed an improper practice charge alleging, in 
substance, that, in July 2002, Assistant Watch Commanders at the Downstate 
1
 37 PERB H4566 (2004). 
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Correctional Facility (Downstate) unilaterally began to deny pre-approved sick leave 
requests for four hours or less which was contrary to the past practice of approving such 
requests and using additional employees, who were assigned eight hours of overtime, 
to cover for the absent employees. 
On April 7, 2003, DOCS filed its answer alleging, inter alia, that the facility's 
actions were consistent with a DOCS' statewide directive which established a sick leave 
procedure for medical appointments. The answer did not plead the affirmative defense 
of timeliness. The directive, dated December 20, 2001, is entitled "Sick Leave at Full 
Pay".2 Under Section III. Sick Leave Accruals Utilization, subpart C, Medical or Dental 
Appointments and Family Sick Leave it provides: 
Employees who wish to apply sick leave accruals for absences for 
medical or dental appointments must request time off in advance in the 
same manner used for annual or personal leave. When granting such 
leave, consideration should be given to the time of the appointment 
and the location of the medical facility. Medical appointments, in most 
instances, do not require full-day absences. To be considered pre-
approved, a time-off slip must be filled out and approved no later than 
the previous day . . . . 
NYSCOPBA witness Donald Premo, a corrections sergeant at Hudson 
Correctional Facility and NYSCOPBA's Associate Grievance Director, testified that 
correctional facility managers review every request for leave because there is no 
automatic leave and they are required to follow directives from the DOCS central office. 
Diane Davis, a corrections sergeant, is NYSCOPBA's recording secretary. She 
previously worked at Downstate as Assistant Watch Commander and prepared 
corrections officers' work charts for each day. In that capacity, she testified that she 
2
 ALJ's Exhibit 3. 
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received requests for doctors' appointments 24 hours in advance of the appointments 
and that these requests were routinely approved. 
Corrections sergeant Homer Chin was assigned to Downstate where he 
functioned as an Assistant Watch Commander. In that position, Chin completed the 
work charts. He stated that a sick leave request for four hours or less had to be 
submitted a day in advance. Prior to November 2002, he never denied anyone's 
request, if timely submitted, but he had the discretion to deny a timely request for sick 
leave if he did not have the manpower to relieve the officer making the request. Chin 
testified that he received an order sometime in 2003 prohibiting him from filling an 
officer's absence of four hours or less with an officer who would be receiving eight hours 
of overtime pay.3 
Walter Clark, NYSCOPBA's Chief Steward for Downstate, testified that he first 
became aware of the denial of pre-approved sick leave requests in July 2002. Upon 
learning of the denial, he called NYSCOPBA's regional office for assistance. On August 
9, 2002, Clark discussed the subject of the denial of pre-approved sick leave requests 
for four hours or less with Frank Tracy, Downstate's Superintendent, in a 
labor/management meeting, but without reaching a resolution of the dispute. Other 
denials of pre-approved sick leave occurred in November 2002. 
At the conclusion of NYSCOPBA's direct case, counsel for DOCS moved to 
amend DOCS' answer to include the affirmative defense of timeliness and to dismiss 
NYSCOPBA's charge for failing to establish a prima facie case. DOCS argued that the 
3
 Charging Party's Exhibit 1. 
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right to determine staffing levels is nonmandatory and, in the alternative, the charge was 
untimely. 
The ALJ reserved on the motion, closed the record to consider the motions, and 
requested briefs from parties. The ALJ, upon consideration of the parties' arguments, 
thereafter dismissed the charge because DOCS' determination of staffing levels, which 
was the basis of the alleged change, was not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
DISCUSSION 
We have held that in order to establish a unilateral change in a past practice, the 
charging party has the burden to show that: 
[T]he alleged past practice affected a mandatory subject of bargaining, 
that the practice was unequivocal and existed for a significant period of 
time such that the employees in the unit could reasonably expect the 
practice to continue.4 
In other words, NYSCOPBA has the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of 
the reliable evidence that pre-approved sick leave is a mandatory subject of negotiation, 
that a practice with respect to its use had, in fact, existed,5 and that DOCS' action in 
denying the use of pre-approved sick leave is a change in that practice. If NYSCOPBA 
fails to prove an essential element of the charge, the charge must be dismissed.6 
4
 Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free Sch. Dist, 38 PERB 1J3006, at 3018 (2005); County of 
Nassau, 35 PERB 1J3036, at 3018 (2002). 
5
 State of New York, 33 PERB 1J3024 (2000), confirmed sub nom. Benson v Cuevas, 
288 AD2d 542, 34 PERB 1J7034 (3d Dep't 2001). 
6
 Id. 
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NYSCOPBA may not rely upon cross-examination of the respondent's witnesses to 
establish a prima facie case.7 
We have previously established a standard of proof by which to judge the merits 
of a motion to dismiss and concluded that, with respect to 
. . . a motion made to [an ALJ] to dismiss a charge after the 
presentation of charging party's evidence . . . we would reverse [an 
ALJ's] decision to grant such a motion unless we could conclude that 
the evidence produced by the charging party, including all reasonable 
inferences therefrom, is plainly insufficient even in the absence of any 
rebuttal 8 
Here, while the ALJ characterized DOCS' action of pre-approving sick leave as a 
practice rather than a procedure, NYSCOPBA has failed to prove that the alleged past 
practice involved a mandatory subject of bargaining. The ALJ correctly concluded that 
our decision in Town of Carmef was dispositive of the instant matter. We agree. In 
Carmel, we held that the employer's action in changing the vacation pick system did not 
violate the Act because the change affected only the number of employees scheduled 
to be on duty at specific times without diminishing the amount of their vacation time. 
NYSCOPBA argues that the ALJ erred by equating pre-approved sick leave with 
pre-approved vacation leave because sick leave is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
We reject that argument because, while sick leave, like vacation leave, is a function of 
hours of work and thereby a mandatory subject of negotiation, the charge deals with 
DOCS' decision to pre-approve sick leave and the restrictions that DOCS placed on the 
B
 County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB 1J3013, at 3029-330 (1984). 
9
 31 PERB 1J3006 (1998), confirmed sub nom. Town of Carmel Police Benev. Ass'n, Inc. 
v PERB, 267 AD2d 858, 32 PERB 1J7028 (3d Dep't 1999). 
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pre-approval.10 As was the case in Carmel, pre-approval necessarily constrains an 
employer's right to set staffing levels, a nonmandatory subject of negotiation.11 
We also reject NYSCOPBA's arguments that any cost savings realized by DOCS 
Downstate reducing the amount of overtime to fill the posts of absent officers cannot be 
recognized as part of its management prerogative to determine its staffing needs. 
NYSCOPBA's argument is that DOCS' change in the manner in which pre-approval for 
sick leave of four hours or less is granted results in a lack of volunteers who are willing 
to work less than eight hours of overtime. The record is clear that pre-approval for sick 
leave of four hours or less has always been conditioned upon the staffing needs of the 
facility. There is no evidence in the record that DOCS has limited its discretion to 
determine its staffing needs and, in so doing, determining when to pre-approve sick 
leave of four hours or less. 
For the reasons discussed above, NYSCOPBA's exceptions are denied, and the 
ALJ's decision is affirmed. Based on our affirmance, we need not reach NYSCOPBA's 
exception to that part of the ALJ's decision that finds an alternative basis to dismiss the 
charge - that neither the Governor nor GOER was shown to have consented to, 
acquiesced in, or condoned the alleged practice or the change thereto - and we also do 
not reach DOCS' cross-exceptions. 
10
 City of Albany, 7 PERB 1J3078 (1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. City of Albany 
v Helsby, 48 AD2d 998, 8 PERB 1J7012 (3d Dep't 1975), aff'd 38 NY2d 778, 9 PERB 
117005(1975). 
11
 City of White Plains, 5 PERB 1J3008 (1972). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed 
in its entirety. 
DATED: August 8, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Village of Suffern (Village) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a petition filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). While CSEA had 
originally petitioned for a single overall unit of certain unrepresented Village employees, 
it was agreed by the parties that there would be two units of employees, one of rank-
and-file employees and one of supervisory employees, should the ALJ find that certain 
employees are not managerial and/or confidential within the meaning of §201.7(a) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
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After a hearing, the ALJ issued his decision finding that the duties of certain 
employees alleged by the Village to be managerial and exempt from representation are 
supervisory rather than managerial. The ALJ also found that the duties and 
employment relationship of certain employees alleged by the Village to be confidential 
did not meet the standard for designation as a confidential employee. The ALJ then 
defined the most appropriate bargaining units as: 
Unit I: 
Included: Maintenance Mechanic I, Assistant Maintenance 
Mechanic, Chief Operator IIA-Water Treatment, Assistant Operator 
Grade 2-A Waste Water, Motor Equipment Operator I, Motor 
Equipment Operator II, Sewer and Water System Mechanic I, Auto 
Mechanic II, Sanitation Worker, Laborer, Clerk, Senior Clerk, 
Account Clerk/Deputy Treasurer, Senior Clerk Typist, Secretary/ 
Deputy Clerk, Justice Court Clerk. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Unit II: 
Included: Assistant Operator Grade 3A/Supervisor, Maintenance 
Supervisor I, Motor Equipment Operator I I/Supervisor, and Motor 
Equipment Operator I I/Assistant Supervisor. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Village excepts to the ALJ's determinations that the alleged managerial 
employees are, in fact, mid-level supervisors; that the employment duties of certain of 
the alleged confidential employees do not deprive them of representational rights under 
the Act; and that the Village Clerk is a managerial employee. 
CSEA's response to the exceptions supports the ALJ's determination. 
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Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's determinations. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision1 and are repeated here only as 
necessary for our discussion of the exceptions. 
On May 21, 2004, CSEA filed a petition for certification of all full-time employees 
of the employer.2 The Village objected to the inclusion of certain employees in the 
proposed bargaining unit that it considered to be either managerial or confidential. 
James J. Giannettino, Village Mayor, testified on behalf of the Village that he 
oversees the operations of the entire Village. He described the structure of the 
Department of Public Works (DPW), where a number of the petitioned-for employees 
are assigned.3 DPWs Director is Joseph Hornik, and he oversees three separate units 
within the DPW: Street and Refuse, Water, and Waste Water Treatment. Individual 
employees "run each division or section and report to him."4 
The Village contends the employees who run each division or section:- John 
DeGraw, Motor Equipment Operator I I/Supervisor; DeGraw's Assistant, Daniel Haglund, 
1
 38 PERB H4006 (2005). 
2
 The petition excluded police officers and public safety dispatchers, who are currently 
represented. 
3
 Giannettino described the organizational chart of the Village as composed of the 
Office of the Mayor, Board of Trustees, Department of Public Works, Recreation, 
Building, Treasurer, Police, Village Clerk and Village Court. 
4
 Transcript, p. 21. 
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Motor Equipment Operator ll/Assistant Supervisor; Nick Duvo, Sr., Assistant Operator 
Grade 3A/Supervisor; and Robert Conklin, Maintenance Supervisor I - should be 
designated managerial and excluded from CSEA's proposed bargaining unit:. 
DeGraw is designated Supervisor of Street and Refuse and oversees the unit, 
has input into work rule changes, and is involved with the departmental budget. With 
respect to personnel policies, DeGraw can initiate policies that make his department run 
more efficiently, such as work rules, break times, and anything else that affects his 
department. DeGraw writes up any proposed discipline and submits it to Hornik. 
DeGraw has the authority to deduct pay from his employees for an unexcused absence. 
Haglund would assume DeGraw's position in his absence. His regular duties 
include being 
[o]n the road making sure that the crews are doing what they're 
supposed to do... [and] the power to recommend any kind of changes 
he needs to get his mission accomplished. [Supervisors are] there to 
manage their department and get optimal performance out of the 
people they supervise, and they have the latitude to make 
suggestions and recommendations and implement those once they 
are deemed a good situation.5 
Duvo, Sr., is in charge of the waste water treatment plant. He shares the same 
responsibilities over his unit as DeGraw does in his unit. Conklin is in charge of the 
Water Department and functions "pretty much the same as the other 
people... described."6 
5
 Transcript, p. 27. 
6
 Transcript, p. 36. 
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Each of the three, Duvo, Sr., DeGraw and Conklin, make a budget 
recommendation to Hornik, who then considers the recommendations in preparing the 
DPW budget. Hornik has to approve any request from an employee for a permanent 
schedule change. 
The procedure for promotion within DPW starts with the supervisor and assistant 
supervisor compiling a list of people they feel are qualified for promotion. Their 
recommendations are discussed with Hornik, and when they come to a decision, it is 
discussed with Giannettino.7 
Giannettino acknowledged that none of the three, Duvo, Sr., DeGraw or Conklin, 
sits as a member of the Village work rule committee. The committee members include 
department heads, the Mayor, and any member of the Board of Trustees available for a 
meeting.8 Duvo, Sr., DeGraw and Conklin serve only as resource persons during 
negotiations because the actual negotiations are conducted by either the Village 
Attorney or Giannettino. 
The Village also objected to the inclusion of certain support staff from the Village 
Clerk's office, the Treasurer's office and the Village Court in CSEA's proposed unit on 
the grounds that they are confidential employees as defined by the Act. They are 
Christine Anderson, Village Court Clerk; Kathleen Van Sickle, Deputy Village Clerk; 
Joann Cioffi, Senior Clerk; Barbara Cottiers, Account Clerk/Deputy Treasurer; and 
Lynne Bryant, Clerk Typist 
7
 Transcript, pp. 63-64. 
8
 Transcript, pp. 68-69. 
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Anderson is responsible for the administrative work of the Village Court and 
oversees two employees. At budget time, she prepares a proposed budget and meets 
with the village budget committee. The Court functions independent of Village 
supervisory control. 
Virginia Menschner, Village Clerk, handles the administrative functions of the 
Village. The Village has no administrator, nor does it have a human resource officer. 
The Village Clerk sits at the Board meetings, including executive session when policy 
matters are discussed. When questioned, Menschner provides her opinion to both the 
Board of Trustees and to Giannettino. She assigns work to her staff and authorizes 
leaves from work.9 
Within the Village Clerk's office, VanSickle serves as secretary to the Mayor and 
the Village Attorney. She types all their correspondence including letters and notes 
regarding the status of negotiations. Cioffi reports directly to the Village Clerk. Cioffi is 
responsible for, and has unrestricted access to, all the personnel records, including 
health insurance information. She does occasional secretarial work for the Village 
Attorney as well as the Mayor when Van Sickle is unavailable. Bryant does general 
typing, answers inquiries from the public at the counter, handles some billing and payroll 
matters, in addition to other clerical tasks. While performing payroll duties, she has 
access to time records and personnel records of the Village employees. 
9
 The Village alleges that the ALJ disallowed further testimony about Menscher's 
managerial duties. The ALJ indicated that he was satisfied with the evidence of 
Menscher's role as a policy-maker and inquired whether there was any evidence that 
she had other managerial duties, such as involvement in contract or personnel 
administration. There was no evidence introduced in support of either of those areas of 
responsibility. Transcript, pp.89-93. 
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With regard to the employees in the Village Treasurer's office, Cottiers works 
directly for the Treasurer in the capacity as the Deputy Treasurer. She assists in 
calculating pay increases, health insurance rates for budget purposes, and longevity 
increases. She has access to all the personnel records and has knowledge of the 
calculations used during negotiations. 
Cottiers testified as a rebuttal witness for CSEA. She stated that her civil service 
title is Account Clerk and that Deputy Treasurer is her "in-house" title. She described 
her duties as overseeing payroll, preparing water and sewer bills, making general 
entries relating to accounting and transferring funds.10 Cottiers was not involved in the 
calculations for the police bargaining unit negotiations. She does not sit at the 
negotiating table and is not privy to any collective bargaining issues during negotiations. 
Cottiers acknowledged that she does the employees' pay increases for the 
budget submitted to the Board of Trustees. She prepares different salary comparisons 
during the negotiations with the dispatchers and she has unrestricted access to the file 
cabinets in her office. However, she stated that, as far as collective bargaining 
negotiations, she has no knowledge of whether the Treasurer hides additional money or 
where it might be hidden in the budget. 
DISCUSSION 
Any doubt as to the managerial status of an employee must be decided in favor 
of coverage by the Act.11 The statutory criteria have been applied conservatively in 
10
 Transcript, p. 5. 
11
 Act, §201.7(a). See also Owego-Apalachin Cent. Sch. Dist, 33 PERB 1J3005 (2000). 
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order to prevent an employee from being denied collective bargaining rights based upon 
speculation.12 The Act is quite specific regarding the criteria for managerial designation: 
the employee must (1) formulate policy, or (2) reasonably be required to assist directly 
in the preparation for and conduct of collective negotiations, or (3) have a major role in 
the administration of collective agreements or personnel administration. It is not 
necessary to satisfy all standards in order to consider an employee managerial.13 
On this record, the Village failed to establish facts sufficient to designate Duvo, 
Sr., Conklin, DeGraw and Haglund employees as managerial. At best, Gianettino's 
testimony established the structure of an administrative team within the DPW. The 
department head, Hornik, recommends and implements Village policy regarding DPW 
matters established by the Mayor and Board of Trustees. Any department policy 
recommendations made by Duvo, Sr., Conklin, DeGraw or Haglund that may impact the 
Village budget are first submitted to Hornik for his consideration before they are 
submitted to Gianettino and the Board of Trustees for their review. Without more 
evidence of these employees' participation in the policy-making decisional process, it 
cannot be concluded that they are engaged in the formulation of policies that will have a 
substantial impact upon the affairs and the constituents of the Village government such 
as would warrant their exclusion from the proposed unit.14 
12
 Id., at 3014. 
13
 Id. 
14
 City of Lockport, 30 PERB 1J3049 (1997); Village ofKenmore, 22 PERB 1J3044 
(1989); County of Putnam, 20 PERB 1J3059 (1987). 
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As to their role in negotiations, Duvo, Sr., Conklin, DeGraw and Haglund may 
serve as resource personnel to Gianettino and the Village Attorney who conduct the 
actual negotiations. However, they function merely to offer technical advice to the real 
decision-makers.15 They clearly have no major role in personnel administration. They 
have a limited role in employee discipline. Their supervision and direction of employees 
in their individual sections of the DPWand their responsibility to implement the policy 
determinations of the Mayor and the Village Board clearly establish that they are 
supervisory employees. However, they do not come within the managerial exclusion by 
reason of such status.16 
The ALJ determined that neither Cioffi nor Bryant are confidential employees 
because they do not serve in a confidential capacity to a managerial employee directly 
involved in contract negotiations or contract and personnel administration. While they 
work in the office of the Village Clerk, who is managerial by virtue of her policy-making 
responsibilities, there is no evidence in the record that the Menschner plays any role in 
contract negotiations or administration or personnel administration. The Village asserts 
that the ALJ improperly cut-off its introduction of additional evidence as to these duties; 
however, the record clearly demonstrates that the ALJ simply indicated that there was 
sufficient evidence in the record of Menschner's policy formulation role and inquired if 
there was any evidence of other responsibilities that would support a finding that the 
15
 Supra, note 12. 
16
 See County of Cayuga, 20 PERB 1J3024 (1987). 
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employees working in that office were confidential. The only testimony after that point 
was that Menshcer supervised all the activities of her office, including scheduling and 
the assignment of tasks. 
As Menschner's managerial responsibilities do not include negotiations or 
contract or personnel administration, Cioffi and Bryant cannot be excluded from the 
proposed unit because they act in a confidential capacity to the Village Clerk. An 
employee is confidential for purposes of the Act only when, in the course of assisting a 
managerial employee who exercises labor relations responsibilities, that employee has 
access on is privy to information related to collective bargaining, contract administration, 
or other aspects or labor-management relations on a regular basis which is not 
appropriate for the eyes and ears of rank and file personnel or their negotiating 
representative.17 Cioffi's and Bryant's access to personnel records does not warrant a 
contrary result, nor does the occasional secretarial work performed for the Mayor and 
Village Attorney, because there is no record evidence that either acts in a confidential 
capacity to the Mayor or the Village Attorney.18 
Barbara Cottiers, Deputy Treasurer 
An employee assisting a managerial employee in the performance of duties 
confidential in nature is not necessarily performing those duties in a confidential 
relationship to the managerial employee.19 Here, Cottiers unrebutted testimony 
17
 Penfield Cent. Sch. Dist, 14 PERB 1J4044, aff'd, 14 PERB 1J3082 (1981). 
18
 Town of Ulster, 36 PERB 1J3001 (2003); Town of DeWitt, 32 PERB 1J3001 (1999). 
19
 See Town of DeWitt, supra, note 18. 
Board - C-5411 -11 
disputed the scope of duties described by Giannetino. Colliers' civil service title is 
Account Clerk. She does not do the health insurance calculations nor did she perform 
any calculations for the police bargaining unit. She does not sit at the bargaining table 
nor is she privy to issues connected with collective negotiations. There is no evidence 
that Cottiers' actual duties elevated her assistance to the Village Treasurer to a 
confidential level. 
Christine Anderson, Village Court Clerk 
There is no dispute that the Village Justice has no responsibility with regard to 
formulating Village policy, nor does the Justice have any role in contract negotiations or 
personnel administration for the Village. We concur with the ALJ that there is no basis 
to deny Anderson, as the clerk to the Justice, representational rights under the Act.20 
Anderson's administrative duties and her supervisory role vis-a-vis the other court 
employees do not disqualify her from coverage. 
Based upon the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the decision of the ALJ 
is affirmed. 
For the reasons set forth above, we find the following units to be most 
appropriate: 
Unit I: 
Included: Maintenance Mechanic I, Assistant Maintenance 
Mechanic, Chief Operator IIA-Water Treatment, Assistant 
Operator Grade 2A-Waste Water, Motor Equipment 
zu
 Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist, 21 PERB 1J3047 (1989). See also Village of 
Sleepy Hollow, 31 PERB 1J4036 (1998). 
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Operator I, Motor Equipment Operator II, Sewer and Water 
System Mechanic I, Auto Mechanic II, Sanitation Worker, 
Laborer, Clerk, Senior Clerk, Account Clerk/Deputy 
Treasurer, Senior Clerk Typist, Secretary/Deputy Clerk, 
Justice Court Clerk. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Unit II: 
Included: Assistant Operator Grade 3A/Supervisor, 
Maintenance Supervisor I, Motor Equipment Operator 
I I/Supervisor, and Motor Equipment Operator I I/Assistant 
Supervisor. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the case be remanded to the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation for further processing consistent with 
this decision. 
DATED: August 8, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
Vt^clc^u^^^-^^^^ 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Village of Suffern (Village) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that found a violation of §209-a.1 (a) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act), on an improper practice charge filed 
by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA). The charge alleged that the Village violated the Act when it unilaterally 
imposed new work rules affecting employees of a proposed bargaining unit that CSEA 
sought to represent. 
The Village filed an answer that, as amended, denied the material allegations of 
the charge and alleged, as defenses to the charge, that the revised work rules were not 
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adopted in response to any action taken by CSEA and that CSEA withdrew its initial 
petition for certification on May 21, 2004, thereby rendering the instant charge moot. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Village, in its exceptions, argues that the ALJ erred on the facts and the law. 
The Village contends that, once CSEA withdrew its petition for certification, the petition 
was rendered a nullity. CSEA supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The undisputed facts are as set forth in the ALJ's decision1 and are repeated 
here only as necessary to decide the exceptions. 
CSEA notified the Mayor, James J. Giannettino, by letter dated March 4, 2004, 
that it represented a majority of the Village's full-time employees and requested 
recognition. In that letter, CSEA also informed Giannettino that "all current terms and 
conditions of employment for all employees in the previously mentioned titles above 
must, according to the Taylor Law, remain unchanged until this issue is resolved."2 
Giannettino's uncontradicted testimony was that, upon receipt of CSEA's March 
4, 2004 letter requesting recognition, he consulted with the Village's legal counsel for an 
opinion. Giannettino testified that his legal counsel received an opinion from PERB's 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation that the Village could 
continue with its work in progress on the work rules. 
1
 38 PERB H4522 (2005). 
2
 Joint Exhibit 1. 
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Having received no response to its request for recognition, CSEA, on April 5, 
2004, filed with PERB a petition for certification3 seeking to represent all full-time and 
part-time employees of the employer. On April 22, 2004, the Village's Board of 
Trustees adopted the revised work rules, entitled Standards and Benefits.4 On April 26, 
2004, the Village filed its response to CSEA's petition for certification in Case No. C-
5394. 
On May 14, 2004, CSEA filed this improper practice charge alleging that the 
Village violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) when it adopted new work rules, thereby failing to 
maintain the status quo once a question concerning representation arose. The 
improper practice charge alleged nine separate changes in the work rules. 
On May 17, 2004, a conference was conducted by a PERB ALJ in Case No. 
C-5394. Thereafter, on May 21, 2004, CSEA withdrew its petition in Case No. C-5394 
and simultaneously filed a petition for certification as the collective bargaining 
representative of all full-time employees of the employer.5 
Following a conference conducted on July 15, 2004, by a PERB ALJ in the 
instant charge, the Village filed an amended answer to the improper practice charge. 
That answer generally denied the material allegations and asserted two affirmative 
defenses: the first alleged that the Village had been preparing the revisions to its work 
rules since December 2003, and the second argued that because CSEA withdrew its 
3
 PERB Case No. C-5394. 
4
 Joint Exhibit 3. 
5
 PERB Case No. 
(August 8, 2005). 
C-5411. Village ofSuffern, 38 PERB 1J4006, aff'd 38 PERB 1J3016 
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petition for certification in Case No. C-5394, the improper practice charge was now 
moot. 
CSEA called Scott Brown as its sole witness. Brown, employed by the Village as 
a Mechanical Equipment Operator II, testified that he first saw the revised work rules on 
his supervisor's desk, together with a receipt form. He was given a copy and asked to 
sign the receipt acknowledging that he received the new rules. He testified that he 
knew the revised work rules had been implemented because the work week of Village 
employees had been changed. At the conclusion of Brown's testimony, CSEA rested. 
The Village called Giannettino as its sole witness. He testified that, immediately 
upon taking office, he began an evaluation of the Village's work rules. This process 
involved members of the Board of Trustees and various department heads, employees, 
and Village officers. This process commenced about December 5, 2003, and continued 
to March 15, 2004. The Village Board of Trustees adopted the revised work rules at a 
special meeting held on April 22, 2004. Giannettino stated that, at the April 22, 2004 
Board meeting, the question of CSEA representation was mentioned and discussed. 
DISCUSSION 
An employer's obligation to maintain the status quo starts on the date it is 
presented with a bona fide representation question and continues to the date a wage 
and benefit package is fixed by collective negotiations with the newly recognized or 
certified employee organization.6 Changes in the status quo during the pendency of a 
representation proceeding violate §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act, even without a 
6
 Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES, 25 PERB 1J3044 (1992), rev'd on other 
grounds, 198 AD2d 824, 26 PERB 1J7015 (4th Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 
81 NY2d 706 (1993). 
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specific finding of animus, because such conduct interferes with fundamental statutory 
rights to representation afforded to public employees by the Act.7 "Such changes in 
employment conditions inherently chill employees in their protected right to seek 
representation through an employee organization of their own choosing, influence the 
employees' choice of bargaining agent, and distort any collective negotiations resulting 
from the certification of a bargaining agent."8 
Here, CSEA filed its petition for certification in Case No. C-5394 on April 5, 2004. 
That petition was withdrawn on May 21, 2004, subsequent to the Village adopting the 
new work rules on April 22, 2004. The Village argues that the effect of the withdrawal of 
CSEA's petition on May 21, 2004 was to render the petition a nullity and vitiate any 
claim that an improper practice occurred prior to the simultaneous filing of CSEA's 
petition in Case No. C-5411 on May 21, 2004. The Village's argument misapprehends 
the nature of the violation found by the ALJ, which we here modify and affirm. 
While the ALJ held that a bona fide question of representation existed from the 
time that CSEA requested recognition on March 4, 2004, we find that, at the very least, 
a bona fide question of representation existed as of April 5, 2004, the date the petition in 
Case No. C-5394 was filed. Once that question was presented, the Village had a 
statutory obligation to maintain the terms and conditions of employment as they existed 
when the petition was filed until the representation question was resolved.9 That the 
' Genesee-Livingston-Steuben-Wyoming BOCES, 29 PERB 1J3065 (1996), confirmed, 
30 PERB 1J7009 (Sup. Ct. Livingston County 1997). 
8
 Id, at 3151. 
9
 Genesee-Livingston-Steuben-Wyoming BOCES, supra, note 6; County of Rockland, 
10 PERB H3098(1977). 
Board - U-25061 -6 
Village had been discussing the changes in work rules prior to the filing of the 
representation petition that it later implemented after the petition was filed does not 
change the status quo at the time the petition was filed. Neither do such discussions 
permit the Village to proceed with the implementation of changes that were only in the 
discussion stage when the representation question was presented. 
The withdrawal of the original petition and the simultaneous filing of the current 
petition subsequent to the Village's implementation of the new work rules, do not, as 
argued by the Village, moot the charge or render the petition filed a nullity. The May 21 
petition differs from the April 5, 2004 petition in that it no longer included part-time 
employees in the proposed bargaining unit. CSEA therefore renounced its 
representation interests in those employees as of May 21, 2004. 
In Genesee-Livingston-Steuben-Wyoming BOCES, supra, at 3151, the Board 
stated: 
To give any employer the legal right to make changes in the 
employment conditions of its employees during the 
pendency of a representation question and prior to the 
certification of a bargaining agent would afford that employer 
an unfair advantage in any negotiations subsequently 
required. Were we to extend to [the employer] the privilege it 
seeks, the [bargaining agent], and all other unions presented 
with unilateral changes in employment conditions after 
seeking certification, would be forced to bargain for a 
restoration of employment conditions which were once 
possessed by the employees who are seeking 
representation. There is nothing in any of our case law or in 
any policy of the Act which would warrant such a result. 
The unit appropriateness issue raised by CSEA's petition in Case No. C-5411 is 
decided by us today and has been remanded to the Director of Public Employment 
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Practices and Representation for further processing consistent with our decision.10 The 
representation question that arose when CSEA filed its original petition in Case No. C-
5394, subsequently re-filed as Case No. C-5411, thus remains pending. 
Accordingly, we find that the Village violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act by 
implementing changes in employees' terms and conditions of employment while a bona 
fide representation petition was pending concerning those employees. 
To the extent that the Village's April 22, 2004 Standards and Benefits apply to 
employees holding positions in the bargaining unit for which CSEA petitioned on April 5, 
2004, and until such time as CSEA abandons, or has abandoned, its interests in 
representing said employees,11 the Village is hereby ordered to, forthwith: 
1. Rescind the Standards and Benefits for Village employees that 
were adopted by the Village Trustees on April 22, 2004, to the 
extent that said Standards and Benefits are new or inconsistent 
with those in effect on April 5, 2004. 
2. Restore the Standards and Benefits that were in effect on April 5, 
2004. 
3. Make the aforementioned employees whole for any wages or 
benefits they lost as a result of the Village's implementation of 
the April 22, 2004 Standards and Benefits, with interest at the 
10 Supra, Note 5. 
11
 As CSEA withdrew the representation petition that included part-time employees on 
May 21, 2004, our order as to those employees is for the time period of April 5, 2004 to 
May 21, 2004, the time during which a bone fide representation question existed as to 
part-time employees of the Village. 
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maximum legal rate from April 22, 2004, until such payments are 
fully satisfied. 
4. Purge the aforementioned employees' personnel files of any 
reference to adverse employment actions taken by the Village as 
a result of said employees' failure to comply with any directives 
concerning new Standards and Benefits or any inconsistent with 
those applicable to said employees on April 5, 2004, and make 
employees whole for any such adverse employment actions, plus 
interest at the maximum legal rate. 
5. As to part-time employees of the Village, implement paragraphs 
1 through 4 of this order for the period from April 5, 2004 to May 
21,2004. 
6. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily 
used to post notices to employees in the unit for which CSEA 
sought to be recognized as bargaining agent. 
DATED: August 8, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Village of Suffern (Village) in the unit petitioned 
for by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) that the Village will forthwith: 
1. Rescind the Standards and Benefits for Village employees that were 
adopted by the Village Trustees on April 22, 2004, to the extent that said 
Standards and Benefits are new or inconsistent with those in effect on 
April 5, 2004. 
2. Restore the Standards and Benefits that were in effect on April 5, 2004. 
3. Make the aforementioned employees whole for any wages or benefits 
they lost as a result of the Village's implementation of the April 22, 2004 
Standards and Benefits, with interest at the maximum legal rate from 
April 22, 2004 until such payments are fully satisfied. 
4. Purge the aforementioned employees' personnel files of any reference to 
adverse employment actions taken by the Village as a result of said 
employees' failure to comply with any new directives or inconsistent with 
those applicable to said employees on April 5, 2004, and make 
employees whole for any such adverse employment actions, plus interest 
at the maximum legal rate. 
5. As to part-time employees of the Village, implement paragraphs 1 
through 4 of this order only for the period from April 5, 2004 to May 21, 
2004. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Village of Suffern 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 791, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5494 
TOWN OF BRIGHTON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 791, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5494 - 2 -
Included: Foreman (Roads), Foreman (Sewer). 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with theTeamsters Local 791, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 8, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF LAKEWOOD POLICE UNIT, 
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY LOCAL 807, CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5506 
VILLAGE OF LAKEWOOD, 
Employer, 
-and-
LAKEWOOD POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,1 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Village of Lakewood Police Unit, 
1The Lakewood Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA), petitioned the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to become an 
affiliate of CSEA. The Village refused to recognize CSEA as the successor to the PBA. 
The instant petition was then filed. 
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Chautauqua County Local 807, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for-the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time Police Officers of the Village of Lakewood. 
Excluded: All others including the Chief of Police. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Village of Lakewood Police Unit, Chautauqua County 
Local 807, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 8, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Guevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 463, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASENO.C-5515 
TOWN OF WHEATFIELD, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Union of Operating Engineers, 
Local 463 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All full-time employees in the Departments of Highway, Water and 
Sewer. 
Excluded: Clerical, part-time and seasonal employees, Highway 
Superintendent, Deputy Highway Superintendent, Superintendent 
of Water and Sewer, Deputy Superintendent of Water and Sewer 
(CrewXeader) 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 463. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 8, 2005 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
